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Special Feature
– Is There a Room for Fiscal Stimulus?
Poland was hit by the global financial crisis in the
4Q2008 that caused  an economic slump of Western
economies. These developments spilled over to
Poland and growth considerably weakened.
Employment continued to grow at a slow pace in the
4Q2008 while the number of unemployed persons
started rapidly increasing at the turn of the year.
Inflationary pressures eased in the 4Q2008 on the
back of falling fuel and food prices (cereals). Despite
weak growth, the trade deficit continued to grow
because of the collapse in exports. The central
government cash deficit came above expectations in
the 4Q2008, but the full-year shortfall was below
original projections. The most meaningful structural
reform was the elimination of early pensions.
Polish economy abruptly entered near-stagnation in
the 4Q2008, as seasonally adjusted GDP grew only
0.3% qoq, versus 0.8% in the 3Q2008. GDP grew 2.9%
yoy compared with 4.8% in the 3Q2008. A large
decline in exports and inventory-unloading were the
main factors of this slowdown, compared with the
3Q2008. Private consumption expenditures upheld its
strong rate of growth. A new year started with a
further worsening of business climate. We outlined
two scenarios in the PEO 3/2009. GDP growth in 2009
could reach 3%, contingent on the resumption of
lending by commercial banks to the non-financial
sector, decisive cuts in the central-bank interest rates
and the moderate global downturn. Meantime, banks
have further restrained lending while the world
economy slipped into the deepest recession since the
second world war. Only, the NBP has delivered and cut
decisively its interest rates, but their transmission to
market interest rates on credits was poor. Since the
bad-case scenario is unfolding, we forecast a
stagnation in the economy in the 1H2008 and a slow
recovery afterwards; GDP should grow less of 1.5% in
2009, consumption will reamain the engine of growth.
GDP growth near zero in the 1H2009 will support
further disinflation whose roots have been mainly on
the supply side so far. Soft demand will arrest
demand inflation while hikes in regulated energy
prices, instituted at the beginning of 2009, are
counterproductive in this respect. The major risk to
disinflation is the strong depreciation of the zloty on
the wave of irrationally high risk-aversion vis-a-vis
currencies in Central Europe to the levels far off  of
the fundamentals. In our view, Polish zloty should
start gradually firming until the yearend, and
assuming this scenario, we forecast a decline the CPI
inflation rate to 1.7% yoy in the 4Q2009; the average
2009 rate would drop to 2.1%. A rather quick return
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of the inflation rate to the middle of the NBP target
of 2.5% yoy and the economic stagnation underpin
our prediction of more interest rate cuts; the easing
cycle will likely end up in the 1H2009 at the rate 3.00-
3.25%, the lowest in history.
Favorable trends on the labor market are over.
Employment is likely to decline and unemployment
to rise for the next 4 to 6 quarters. The registered
rate of unemployment increased more in December
2009 and, in particular, in January 2009 than
seasonal factors would point to. We forecast that
this rate will reach 12.2% at the 2009 yearend and
continue increasing in 2010. The expectations of a
rapid rise in the cyclical unemployment have already
started capping wage demands so the rise in
nominal wages will be much lower than in 2008, but
the rise in real wages will decelerate less than
proportionately due to disinflation. 
The current account deficit rose in euro terms in each
quarter of 2008 on the back of the widening trade
imbalance, but it was quite stable in GDP terms. The
4Q2008 was distinct from previous quarters in a sense
that the prices of commodities stopped pushing it
upward whereas the collapse in exports that had grown
quite fast before, replaced them. Poland should
continue to register a positive growth differential versus
its main EU and post it even vis-a-vis its East European
partners, which would tend to increase the deficit.
However, we think that due to the collapse in private
business investment in this country and low prices of
commodities imports will shrink more than exports in
euro terms. The large-scale zloty depreciation that gives
Polish companies a strong competitive edge, will also
be instrumental in the reversal of the widening trend in
the trade deficit and support the decline in the current
account shortfall relative to GDP.
Data CASE forecasts
2008 2009Indicator
2005 2006 2007
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2008* 2009
Nominal GDP, PLN bn 983.3 1060.1 1175.3 295.3 309.9 312.1 349.3 304.2 317.6 322.5 364.4 1266.6 1308.7
(% change, yoy)          
GDP 3.6 6.2 6.7 6.0 5.8 4.8 2.9 0.0 0.7 1.6 2.8 4.8 1.4
Private Consumption 2.0 5.0 5.0 5.6 5.5 5.1 5.2 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.7 5.4 3.1
Fixed Investment 6.5 14.9 17.6 15.7 15.2 3.5 3.5 -9.0 -6.1 -3.0 -1.9 7.9 -4.0
(4Q, % of GDP)          
CA balance -1.2 -2.7 -4.7 -4.9 -5.1 -5.2 -5.4 -5.2 -4.6 -4.4 -4.3 -5.4 -4.3
           
(% change, yoy)          
Exports (NBP, EUR) 17.8 20.4 13.4 20.3 21.3 17.9 -8.5 -23.1 -17.3 -13.9 4.3 12.1 -13.1
Imports (NBP,(EUR) 13.4 24.0 19.5 21.7 24.2 21.1 -3.2 -22.2 -19.9 -13.7 -1.3 14.1 -14.0
     
(% change, yoy)    
Industrial sales 3.7 11.2 9.5 8.5 8.5 3.4 -6.3 -12.0 -5.0 -2.0 1.0 3.3 -4.3
Gross value added 3.3 6.0 6.6 5.5 6.1 4.7 3.4 0.1 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.9 1.4
           
CPI 2.1 1.0 2.5 4.1 4.3 4.7 3.7 2.9 2.1 1.8 1.7 4.2 2.1
PPI 0.7 2.3 2.3 3.0 2.5 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4
Nominal Ave. Wage 3.8 4.9 8.7 10.1 11.6 10.6 7.7 6.7 6.5 4.4 2.8 10.4 5.0
           
Employment %, LFS 2.3 3.1 3.1 4.6 3.5 3.6 3.0 1.2 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 3.7 -1.0
Registered unemployment
rate (%, eop)
17.6 14.8 11.4 10.9 9.4 8.9 9.5 11.2 11.4 11.2 12.2 9.5 12.2
           
 PLN/EUR, eop 3.86 3.83 3.58 3.53 3.35 3.41 4.17 4.70 4.50 4.20 4.00 4.17 4.00
           
WIBOR 3M, %, eop 4.60 4.20 5.68 6.15 6.65 6.63 5.88 4.40 3.85 3.80 3.75 5.88 3.75
Central bank key rate eop 4.50 4.00 5.00 5.75 6.00 6.00 5.00 3.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 5.00 3.25
           
(% change, yoy eop)          
Broad Money (M3) 13.1 16.0 13.4 13.6 16.3 17.3 18.6 17.0 15.0 10.0 7.0 18.6 7.0
           
Loans to HH 26.0 33.4 37.9 37.4 34.4 33.5 44.6 40.0 29.5 20.0 11.0 44.6 11.0
           
Loans to Firms 2.5 13.7 24.1 25.2 24.5 24.1 29.0 26.0 21.0 13.0 6.1 29.0 6.0
           
(% GDP)          
Fiscal Balance -4.3 -3.8 -2.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. -2.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -2.8 -3.5
Public Debt eop 47.1 47.7 44.9  n.a. 43.1 n.a. 46.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 46.1 47.0
Table 1. The Polish economy – main macroeconomic indicators and CASE forecasts
(*) data or estimates
Sources: CSO (GUS), Eurostat, NBP and CASE own calculations.
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Economic growth
Preliminary data on economic growth in the 4Q208 clearly show that the
global crisis affected Poland not only through exports, but also through the
financial channel as the poor access to investment credit diminished
expectations about profitability of investment projects, cast doubts about a
possibility of their financing and instilled pessimism about growth prospects.
GDP grew by 2.9% yoy in the 4Q2008, the slowest since the 1Q2005, when
the economy unloaded inventories, accumulated during the so-called
accession boom before May 2004. At present, conditions are different and
inventories are rising due to the lack of demand, in particular, foreign. The
positive y-o-y rate of growth masks the fact that the economy barely
expanded in this period as the seasonally adjusted GDP expanded by 0.3%
qoq only, compared with 0.8% - 1.0% qoq in the previous quarters of the
year. Such a low quarterly figure was last seen in the 1Q2002, when the
economy stagnated. To recall, GDP grew by 1.2% in 2001 and 1.4% in 2002.
Therefore the 4Q2008 performance of the economy augurs badly for the
short-term growth prospects.
Domestic demand increased by 3.6% yoy in the final quarter of 2008 so the
slowdown of GDP expansion was mainly due to the collapse of exports that
decreased by 2.6% yoy in the 4Q2008, but much more in seasonally adjusted
terms, i.e. 3.4% qoq. This collapse was not fully offset by imports, which
declined by 0.3% yoy and seasonally adjusted 2.1% qoq so net exports
contributed negatively to growth after they were positive in the 3Q2008.
Moreover this negative contribution was relatively strong. 
Domestic demand rose faster than GDP, but gross investment that consists of
gross fixed business investment and inventory changes was another factor of
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLISH ECONOMY
The 4Q2009 witnessed a twice larger increase in
the cash central government budget deficit than
government expectations. The state revenue was
much lower than predicted while a lower-than
planned expenditure was unable to offset it. Our
forecast from the PEO 3/2008 proved accurate that
the 2008 deficit would reach PLN 24 bn, i.e. below
the original projection of 27 PLN bn. The government
sticks to the deficit projection of PLN 18.1 bn in 2009
despite a downward revision of its growth forecast,
planning large expenditure cuts. However, we are
skeptical that they will be sufficient since
government growth forecasts seem overly optimistic.
The work of automatic stabilizers such as income
taxes and social security premia will also tend to raise
the deficit of local governments and social insurance.
Local governments will also speed up their
infrastructure outlays. Therefore we forecast that the
general government deficit will reach 3.0 - 3.5% of
GDP in 2009, compared with the government target
of 2.5% of GDP. The breach of 3% could cloud the
outlook for the ERM-2 entry.
The deficit plans are consistent with the intent to
adopt the euro in 2012, but this date is becoming
more and more uncertain because of the soft zloty
and its high volatility likewise the lack of political
consensus in this country. The necessary amendments
of the Constitution hinge on the yes by the main
opposition party. Even if the government were able
to stick to its deficit target, it is unable to eliminate
the political risk before presidential and
parliamentary elections due in 2010 and 2011,
respectively. This may lead to the excessive volatility
of the zloty.
The debate whether Poland should adopt an
expansionary fiscal policy to prop its economy like
others do, has recently been lively in Poland. The
government rejected this possibility, sticking to the
"road map to euro". We take the subject in our Special
Feature: Is There a Room for Fiscal Stimulus?
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the slowdown in the 4Q2008. Its growth rate fell to 1.5% yoy in the 4Q2008
from 5.6% yoy in the 3Q2008, but it is interesting that, in seasonally adjusted
terms, a decline was higher in the 3Q2008 than in the 4Q2008, i.e. by 0.9% qoq
and 0.1% qoq, respectively. Fixed business investment rose by 3.5% yoy, the
same as in the 3Q2008 and compared with over 15.4% yoy in the first half of
2008. Interestingly though, it decreased by 0.7% qoq in seasonally adjusted
terms in the 3Q2008 whereas it expanded by 0.8% qoq in the 4Q2008. Firms
saw that excessive inventories piled up in the 3Q2008 so they started unloading
them in the 4Q2008. Disinventories shaved 0.6% of GDP growth, therefore the
gross-investment contribution to GDP growth fell considerably, but, in contrast,
fixed business investment actually picked up. A couple of conclusions come to
mind. Thus, the slowdown in investment started in the 3Q2008, most likely
ignited by the diminishing prospects for the world demand that multinational
companies transmitted to their daughter companies in Poland. The figures
suggest that the deceleration in fixed business investment preceded the
tightening of lending standards by Polish banks and higher spreads on loans in
the 4Q2008. Its return to growth in the 4Q2008 is most likely related to the
pickup in public fixed investment, as EU funds had to be used up by the
yearend, otherwise they would have to be reimbursed.
Figure 1. GDP growth factors, quarterly % yoy
Private consumption, a main driver of growth, kept steady as it consistently
rose over 5% yoy in each quarter of 2008, i.e. 5.1% yoy and 5.2% yoy in the
3Q2008 and 4Q2008, respectively. Seasonally adjusted growth on a quarterly
basis was stable throughout the year as well (1.2% -1.4% qoq). This happened
on the back of rising wages and salaries as well as employment. The y-o-y
growth in wages and employment slowed in the 4Q2008, but this did not
impact consumption adversely. Consumer confidence started worsening in
the 2H2008, but, apparently, did not impact consumer expenditure, either.
Was it the final party on Titanic ?
On the supply side, poor performance of exports coincided with a drop in
sold industrial output by 6.3% yoy in the 4Q2008, compared with an increase
of 2.2% yoy in the 3Q2008 and rates of growth above 7% yoy in the past six
consecutive quarters. On the seasonally corrected basis, industrial output fell
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even more. Thus both series reported consistent results. Starting October 2008,
new orders in industry have been decreasing each month on a yearly and
monthly basis and export orders have experienced a virtual slump since then. 
The domestic side upheld better, but it also felt the brunt of the global
recession in the 4Q2008. Estimated construction sales increased by 3.8% yoy
in the 4Q2008, compared with 9.4% and 16.5% yoy in the 3Q2008 and the
2Q2008, respectively. Estimated real retail turnover rose by 4.7% yoy in the
4Q2008, compared with 8.0% yoy and in the 3Q2008. 
The outlook for the 1Q2009 and beyond has worsened further since the
previous issue. The external environment has plunged into the deepest
recession in the post-war period and foreign orders have collapsed. The
deterioration in the business sentiment indicators to the levels below the ones
recorded during the 2001 recession, implies that pessimism is overwhelming.
It pervades consumers as well. Firms hoard cash because they have problems
to renew or receive working capital from banks while households, scared by
the prospects of unemployment, increase their savings. Increased savings may
be rational from a microeconomic point of view, but, in aggregate, their
massive rise will lead to a fall in domestic demand in the short-run so GDP
growth will slow. Therefore the economy will inevitably experience the
negative consequences, described by the Keynesian paradox of thrift.
Consumers under stress may spend a small fraction of the cut in personal
income tax (0.7% of GDP) and pensioners may also save the generous pension
compensation for 2008 (a rise by about 6% in nominal terms). Rising
unemployment and lower rise in nominal wages in 2009 will also tend to cap
the expansion of personal consumption. Consumer credit growth has
considerably slowed as banks continue to tighten credit standards and limit a
size of loans as well. Despite these qualifications, personal consumption will
remain an engine of growth in 2009.
With regard to fixed business investment, the culmination of the financial
market crisis in the 4Q2008 led to revisions of numerous investment plans of
private firms. Their fixed business investment will significantly decline in 2009
and it remains uncertain to which extent this drop will be offset by the
acceleration in public investment into infrastructure, based on the use of the
structural funds from the EU. We assume that it will be partially achieved.
Nonetheless, domestic demand should remain the engine of GDP growth in
2009, and the higher the public investment will be, the stronger multiplier
effects will be spread over the economy. 
Foreign demand will likely drag Polish economy down, as Poland's main
partners experience a severe recession, but imports should fall in line with exports
as well due to the down-sized private fixed investment, cheap commodities and
the depreciated zloty. As a result, net exports will likely remain negative, but of
the similar order as in 2008, i.e. -0.4% of GDP. The substantial nominal
depreciation of the zloty – it lost some 30% in value against the euro since the
collapse of an investment bank Lehman Brothers - translated into the real
effective depreciation (Figure 10) has improved profitability of Polish exports very
much. The previous such episode was in the fall of 2003 and the 1Q2004, when
it spurred recovery of the Polish economy after two years of stagnation. However,
the world economy was picking up at that time after the recession of 2001-2002.
At present, the global economy is shrinking so that external demand is very weak
and falling. It is unclear whether Polish companies will be able to increase their
share in the declining markets despite their enhanced profitability that should
enable them to cut prices in order boost sales. 
We stated in the PEO 3/2008 that if commercial banks do not resume
lending, the central bank does not cut interest rates and the global economy
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plunges in the deep recession, Poland would stagnate. This course of events
is most likely in the 1H2009, however, due to the ever-deteriorating global
environment we cannot exclude a recession in Poland in the 1H2009.  A start
of a gradual recovery should occur in the 2H2009, but potential GDP growth
will not be restored until the late 2010. The pessimistic scenario is
materializing since central bank interest rate cuts have not been transmitted
to lower market interest rates as commercial banks raised their credit margins
and tightened credit standards for customers.
Inflation and Monetary Policy
Current situation
CPI inflation slowed down markedly to 3.7% yoy on average in the fourth
quarter – down by a one percentage point compared to the third quarter- and
further to 3.1% in January (preliminary estimate). This decline reflected a sharp
deceleration of prices of foodstuffs (cereal, dairy and fruits) and fuel  - both were
responsible for pushing inflation up in late 2007 and 2008. Growth of prices of
services remains high while prices of non-energy industrial goods continued to
slow down showing in late 2008 the lowest dynamics since early 2007. 
Inflation declined thanks to the reversal of food and fuel supply shocks that
struck global markets in mid-2007. This is clearly discernible from the behavior
of core inflation without food and energy, which has leveled off at 2.7-2.9%
yoy since August 2008, providing evidence for the stability of the remainder
of the consumer basket. Prices of food are tumbling down at global markets
with the IFS index of agricultural raw materials down by 25% year on year in
January 2009, including wheat which saw a price cut of 35%. Procurement
prices in the Polish market seem to have declined even more with wheat, rye
and maize all sold at roughly at half of the last year's price in January. The
result are sharply falling inflation rates of retail prices of related foodstuffs:
bread and cereals have seen their annual dynamics fall from 13.5% in the
third quarter (the highest since early 2001) down to 7.3% in the fourth
quarter and 6.6% in January 2009. Likewise, prices of dairy products have
seen their dynamics fall to 0.7% year on year in the 4Q2008 and further to -
1.2% in January 2009, down from 14.9% in the 1Q2008.  Inflation of fruits
and vegetables oils has also come down from near 30% and near 15%  in the
1Q2008, respectively, to -6% and 3% in the fourth quarter.
Despite marked weakening of the zloty in recent months prices of industrial
goods continue to exhibit very low inflation, reflecting shrinking domestic and
foreign demand. The Polish currency depreciated by 22% in the fourth quarter
alone (end-quarter values) and by further 11% in the first two months of 2009,
but transmission to prices of tradables has been rather limited so far. The
aggregate of non-energy industrial goods picked up marginally from 0.7% yoy
in the 3Q2009 to 0.9% in the 4Q2009, solely as a result of slight acceleration
in the group of semi-durables and non-durables while the most intensely
traded durables have actually seen their dynamics decline from -0.4% to -0.5%
yoy in the third and fourth quarters, respectively1. The developments of CPI
groups confirm that no significant change in key industrial goods can be
discerned. Clothing&footwear continue their deflationary trend (-6.5% yoy in
the 4Q2008 and January 2009) as does electronics (-13.4% in the 4Q2008 and
-12.9% in January 2009) and home appliances while inflation of home
furnishings remained very low, well below 2% in the same period.
1 Eurostat data referring to the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices – HICP.
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Figure 2. Annual inflation in Poland, quarterly, % yoy
Core inflation excluding administrative prices declined markedly in the
fourth quarter to 3.5% yoy (from 4.3% in the 3Q2009) and got very close to
the headline inflation. This signals that the effect of administrative price
adjustments has been neutral in the fourth quarter and suggests the gradual
convergence of growth of administrative price to that of free-market prices.
The major impact on the developments of the administrative component of
the CPI basket was due to fuel whose price decelerated from 6.2% in 3Q2008
to -6.5% in 4Q and -15% in January 2009, reflecting sharp declines of global
prices of crude oil, traded in February 2009 at a mere one-third of the peak
July 2008 price. On the other hand, inflation of all other energy carriers
combined (electricity, gas, furnace fuels, heating and hot water) continues to
rise with the 4Q2008 and January 2009, setting new record highs in a decade
at 13.5% and 13.8% yoy, respectively, markedly up from 11.1% yoy in the
third quarter and 7.4% on average in the first half of 2008. This divergence in
trends of retail prices of vehicle fuel and other energy carriers appears to be
a result of the lower deceleration of world prices of gas and coal compared
to crude oil and, perhaps more importantly, of a significantly higher rigidity
of retail prices of electricity, gas, central heating and hot water. These prices
-unlike the one of fuel- are subject to direct price controls of the Energy
Regulation Agency. The price-approval process by the Agency is quite complex
and accounts for a variety of factors such as EC-imposed environment
policies, ensuing eco-investment needs and individual firm specificities -
making resulting price developments more persistent and much less
correlated with corresponding shifts in world prices.
Producer price inflation picked up to 2.4% in the 4Q2008 and 3.0% in January
2009 from 1.7% in the 3Q2008, mostly on the back of rising prices of energy
and in selected manufacturing industries. Sizeable adjustments of prices of
electricity, hot water and heating occurred in November (by 2.7%) and January
(by 8.3%), lifting the annual price growth in the energy sector sharply from -2%
on average in the first three quarters of 2008 to 1.4% in the fourth quarter and
a record high 20% year on year in January - not registered since 1996. 
In addition to rising energy prices several manufacturing industries have
seen their annual price growth rise in the fourth quarter. This trend was
largely observed in selected heavy industries (production of metals, machinery
and equipment, electronics as well as transport equipment) while other
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industries continue to see their prices decelerate (e.g. chemicals, foodstuffs).
In total, inflation of manufacturing industries increased to 0.8% in 4Q2008
(up from 0.0%) in 3Q to decline again to 0.5% in January 2009.
Mining and quarrying registered a drop in annual price growth to 9.7% yoy
in the 4Q2008 and further down to 6.9% in January from 11.1% in the
3Q2009 – largely on the back of falling prices of coal and copper.
Forecast
In spite of accurate forecasts of fourth-quarter CPI and PPI inflation, we have
revised significantly our predictions for 2009. We forecast average annual CPI
inflation in 2009 to be 0.9 percentage point lower than previously predicted
while for the PPI our expectations are now 0.8 percentage point higher
compared with previous PEO. 
Lower CPI inflation follows directly from the marked worsening of Poland's
economic outlook in the course of past 3-4 months. Key economic institutions
(including big international financial institutions) have significantly reduced GDP
forecasts for Poland, new member states and the UE alike by as much as several
percentage points since last autumn. This directly limits demand for goods and
services both at a global and domestic level, pushing world prices of commodities
down (including the key ones such as oil, wheat and metals) and reducing prices
of all goods and services in line with consumers' shrinking budgets. 
Decelerating demand of Polish consumers is likely to put considerable
pressure on domestic producers and cutting prices may prove to be the only
method of retaining market shares. These pressures are expected to be
particularly severe in sectors producing goods with high income-elasticity of
demand, i.e. those that may suffer the sharpest decline in demand in response
to decelerating disposable income of consumers. This group typically includes
most services and industrial goods such as electronics, clothing, footwear,
home appliances and furnishings and culture-related goods (books, regular
publications). On the other hand foodstuffs typically thought to be relatively
insensitive to income fluctuations may not experience such a profound decline
in demand - however, with sharply falling agricultural commodities they too
are expected to exhibit very low price dynamics in the future quarters. 
Additional deflationary pressures may come from sectors producing
construction materials (not directly covered in the CPI) and many sectors
manufacturing home furnishings, decoration and appliances. Drastic demand
cuts are expected as a result of sharp deceleration of mortgage dynamics (see
chapter on money and credit) as well as other types of consumer loans. 
The behavior of the exchange rate carries the biggest risk for future inflation
forecast. The sudden depreciation of zloty in the fourth quarter of 2008,
continuing in initial months of 2009 appears to have not been transmitted to
consumer prices yet. However, if the currency will not rebound soon this may
mean that some sectors with relatively weaker competition will gradually pass
some of the depreciation burden onto consumers. This is already the case in
the gasoline market where larger price declines (commensurate with the
global price fall) are thwarted by the depreciating zloty. Therefore the current
forecast of low inflation  in 2009 is strongly conditioned on the expectation
of the gradual rebound of the currency. Should the rebound be weaker, occur
later or not occur at all - this will directly translate into higher inflation.
We believe that the balance of all those factors and risks, coupled with the
underlying declines in the world prices of commodities, will translate into a
significant slowing of inflation in Poland. Inflation will fall sharply in the first
quarter of 2009 to 2.9% yoy and decline further 2.1%, 1.8% and 1.7% in
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subsequent quarters of 2009 averaging 2.1% in 2009 as a whole - precisely
half of the 4.2% registered in 2008. 
The PPI inflation forecast is 0.8% higher than previously predicted, solely as
a result of the massive adjustment of energy prices in January 2009, resulting
in a 1.7% hike of PPI on a monthly level. Increases in subsequent months are
expected to be markedly lower which coupled with otherwise negative price
trends throughout manufacturing and mining&querrying results in a forecast
of 2.4% on average in 2009 - compared with 2.4% in 2008.
Monetary Policy
The rapidly deteriorating outlook for economic growth and visible easing of
inflationary pressures prompted the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) to reduce
interest rates in the 4Q2008 and January-February 2009 by the total of 2
percentage points so they dropped to the lowest level, recorded in transition.
The seriousness of the situation was emphasized by a large cut in December
2008, the first cut in December ever. Since inflationary pressures are likely to
weaken further and the economy will enter a stagnation phase for at least
two quarters, according to our predictions, the MPC is forecast to continue
interest rate cuts in the 1H2009. The key interest rate will likely fall to 3 -
3.25% by the end of 1H2009. The cuts could be larger, but the strong zloty
depreciation has become a major risk to inflationary developments in 2009 so
the MPC will likely trim the cuts as the monetary conditions, which take both
the real depreciation and real interest rates into account have considerably
eased. NBP interest rates should remain put in the 2H2009 as the economy
will start slowly recovering and the gradual appreciation of the zloty will help
soften inflationary pressures. Hikes in interest rates seem unlikely before the
end of 1H2010 because the economy will not achieve its potential rate of
growth by then so demand pressures will not resurface while the supply side
inflationary impulses could only come in case of a bad global harvest in 2009. 
Monetary Developments
The climax of the global financial crisis led to distinctive monetary trends
in the 4Q2008 as compared with the previous quarters. The substantial
depreciation of the zloty inflated monetary aggregates, creating a false
impression of an accelerated money and credit expansion. However credit
was frozen.
Nominal monetary expansion as measured by the broad money
aggregate M3 accelerated in the whole of 2008. M3 rose by 18.6% yoy in
December 2008, compared with 17.3%, 16.3% and 13.6% yoy in
September, June and March of 2008, respectively. This coincided with
a pickup in real terms as well despite the increase in inflationary tensions
during the first nine months of the year while disinflation in the 4Q2008
reinforced the upward trend in real money. Deposits grew by 20.6% yoy
in this period, but this aggregate figure masks distinct trends with regard
to household and company deposit that grew by 26.5% and 4.0% yoy,
respectively. The depreciation of the zloty elevated the pace of deposit
expansion, but households also placed their savings with banks, drawn by
aggressive hikes in deposit rates by several of banks as well. Alternative
investments, offering positive rates of return on capital, were rare under
the circumstances of a bear market. In addition to depositing new savings
or redeemed assets at investment funds, households withdrew their
10 POLISH ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 4/2008 (39)
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demand deposits and switched to time deposits. According to the NBP
data, the average zloty deposit rate on time deposits up to 2 years
increased to 6.1% per annum in December 2008 versus 4.6% in
September 2008. This coincided with the central bank interest rate cuts.
Figure 3. Broad Money and Credit Expansion, % yoy
When global financial markets seized in the 4Q2008, foreign parent
companies limited the access of their Polish subsidiaries to credit lines.
There were even reports of a drainage of funds by loss-making and
liquidity-craving parent banks so Polish banks could no longer support the
credit action that was based on the foreign currency lending. Therefore
they responded to the lack of capital by raising deposit rates to non-bank
customers despite a drop in the central bank rates. In a number of cases,
the competition among banks drove temporarily these rates above credit
rates, showing how desperate they were to keep liquidity, when the inter-
bank market dried up, but questioning their responsibility. 
Under these circumstances, the fourth quarter of 2008 was distinct from
earlier quarters of the year because of a collapse in bank lending to the
economy. Polish commercial banks, mostly owned by foreign capital,
transmitted the credit crunch to Poland after the failure of an investment
bank Lehman Brothers as their parent companies cut them credit (swap)
lines in foreign currencies, e.g. in the euro and the Swiss franc, which
served as a basis of credit expansion. Polish banks stopped lending each
other first and then started tightening lending standards to non-financial
enterprises. The seizure of financial markets also led to a substantial rise
in the cost of credit.
In December 2008, credit to households was up 44.6% yoy versus 36.1%
yoy in September 2008. Credit to non-financial firms increased by 29.0%
yoy in December while it was up 24.1% in September (Figure 3). How can
we square the two facts that money supply and credit grew faster in year-
on-year terms in the 4Q2009 than earlier ? A massive depreciation of the
zloty in the 4Q2008 comes as an explanation. The euro gained 22.4%
against the zloty between the beginning and the end of the fourth quarter
of 2008, inflating the value of foreign currency deposits that are included
into the money supply likewise the value of the foreign currency stock of
credit. The strong depreciation of the zloty also caused the share of
foreign currency mortgages to rise substantially Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Housing Credit Credit Growth, % yoy
Therefore annual rates of growth of credit aggregates are misleading, when
they suggest that credit growth was particularly strong in the 4Q2008. To give
an example, all foreign currency assets of financial institutions vis-a-vis the non-
financial sector were worth 148.5 billion zlotys at the end of September 2008
or equivalently 43.6 bn euros. The same euro amount was valued 181.7 bn
zlotys at the end of December 2008, i.e. 33.2 bn zlotys more. (A word of caution
is necessary that a large portion of the foreign exchange bank assets is
denominated in the Swiss franc so our estimates are rough. The currency
breakdown is not published.). Assets of banks vis-a-vis the nonfinancial sector
rose by 63.4 bn zlotys in the 4Q2009 so more than a half of this growth was
related to the depreciation of the zloty. Loans, denominated in the zloty,
increased by 7.5 billion zlotys only in this period, compared with 14.5 billion
zlotys in the 3Q2008, a drop by almost 50%. The amount of new credits,
denominated in the foreign currencies, amounted to the zloty equivalent of
21.7 bn in the 4Q2009, compared with 23.2 billion in the 3Q2009, a fall by 1.5
bn zlotys or 6.5%. However, this implies a lower amount of the foreign currency
equivalent due to the depreciation of the zloty. 
The banking sector was worse off in the 4Q2008, when it disseminated
the global crunch to the Polish market, than in previous quarters of 2008.
Its net income was approximately half of the quarterly net income,
recorded in each of the first three quarters of 2008, i.e. PLN 2.1 bn in the
4Q2008 versus 4.0 bn in the 3Q2008. Numerous banks revealed that they
raised their provisions for irregular credits in this period that diminished
profits. The data of Polish Financial Supervision Authority show that these
provisions and valuation allowances rose by almost 80% in the 4Q2008 as
banks anticipated that a slowdown in the economy will lead to a
substantial worsening of the quality of their credit portfolio. However, the
share of irregular claims on nonfinancial customers did not budge up as it
remained the same 4.4% in the 4Q2008 as in the 3Q2008, the lowest in
history. The worst is yet to come. Perhaps, in the 1Q2009, but banks still
seem to be well capitalized as their risk-weighted capital ratio stood at
10.8% in the 4Q2008, however down from 11.8% in the 3Q2008. Polish
banks do not own US toxic assets, but they are likely to incur losses on
commercial loans and mortgages due to the low-growth environment and
rising unemployment.
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Fiscal Developments and Policy
In 2008, according to the preliminary data, the central government cash
budget registered a deficit of 24.6 bn zlotys or 90.8% of the 27.1 bn zlotys
targeted in the state budget. The shortfall amounted to approximately 1.9%
of preliminary GDP, equal to 1266 bn zlotys. The state revenue came at 254.1
bn zlotys or 9.9% less than originally projected. This gap amounted to
approximately 2.2% of 2008 GDP. The state expenditure at 278.6 bn zlotys
in 2008 was short of the planned 309.0 bn by 30.3 bn zlotys or 9.8%, an
equivalent of almost 2.4% of 2008 GDP. 
Figure 5. Cumulative central government budget deficit, % of annual
projections
With the exception of the 1Q2008, the state budget revenue came lower
each quarter than projected by MoF. This discrepancy had been growing over
the year, but it rose considerably in the 4Q2008 (Figure 6). Such a visible
deterioration in performance was related to a considerable slowdown in
economic growth in this period (see the section on GDP growth). The central
government revenue rose about 7.5% in 2008 versus the projected 19.3% so
the loss of revenue relative to the projections can be estimated as 0.9% of
GDP2. In the 4Q2008, like in the first three quarters of 2008, tax revenue
projections were missed in the case of indirect taxes whereas income taxes
over-performed projections. In particular, the collection of VAT increased 6.0%
yoy in 2008 versus 9.5% in the first three quarters while the state budget bill
provided for a rise of 15.9% in 2008 against the actual collection in 2007. The
government income from excise taxes rose by 3.0% in 2008 (4.9% yoy in the
first three quarters of 2008) versus the projection of 6.5% for the entire year.
These figures point to a worsening of performance in the 4Q2008 on the back
of much slower quarter-on-quarter economic growth. The corporate income
tax (CIT) collection also showed signs of deterioration as the revenue grew
by 10.7% in 2008, compared with 16.6% yoy in January-September 2008, but
it matched a 10.6% projection for the whole year. According to the data on
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2 The actual performance in 2008 is compared to the results of 2007.
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net income of nonfinancial firms with nine and more employees for the first
three quarters, these firms stopped generating positive profits in the 3Q2008.
To the contrary, strong wage growth that continued in the 4Q2008, albeit at
a slightly lower pace, helped boost the personal income tax (PIT) collection. It
grew 8.7% in 2008 versus 7.3% yoy in the first three quarters of 2008 and the
projection of 2.2% for the entire year. The 2008 budget balance was also
improved by the better-than-expected performance of non-tax revenue, but its
share in the sum of tax and the non-tax revenue is about 7.5% so its positive
impact was only moderate.
Figure 6. Actual state revenue and projections, PLN mn
The amount of the EU unrequited transfers that the central government
received in 2008 reached mere 43.2% of the 2008 projections of 35.3 billion
zlotys. This was the main source of the revenue underperformance relative to
the MoF projections for 2008, along with the indirect taxes. In particular,
only 25.7% of structural funds were received, a signal that the
implementation of the EU related projects encountered serious obstacles. In
this way the central government cash budget lost 20.1 bn zlotys in revenue or
estimated 1.6% of GDP in 2008.
The mirror image of this is the lower expenditure on EU related projects
than planned in 2008. As of writing, the figures on the entire 2008 were not
available, but in January – November these outlays were 25.4 bn zlotys
or 55.9% short of the amended 2008 plan. With the slippage on the revenue
side, the burden of keeping the deficit in check in 2008 fell on the
expenditure side in 2008 as we emphasized in previous issues of the PEO.
Expenditure increased by 10.4% in 2008, compared with 12.5% yoy in the
first three quarters of the year and the annual plan of 22.5% so its growth
in the 4Q2008 was weaker than in the remaining part of the year. Public
debt service came lower than projected by 2.6 bn zlotys or 0.2% of
estimated 2008 GDP. There were no overruns in important state budget
positions on the expenditure side in 2008. Subsidies to social security funds
and to local governments were fully provided, but this is the usual course of
events. After the first eleven months of 2008, the expenditure on fixed
investment projects was mere 51.5% of the plan. If 2007 were to be a guide
in this respect this proportion probably increased close to 100% in the
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fourth quarter, when the government usually pays the bills, however small
savings in this position cannot be excluded.
Figure 7. Actual sate expenditure and plan, PLN mn
Since the previous PEO was written, the economic growth prospects in this
country have deteriorated considerably and the MoF has revised down the
main macroeconomic projections for 2008, but it sticks to the cash deficit
of 18.2 billion zlotys in 2009 despite that the original budget draft was based
on the assumption of a 4.8% GDP growth in 2009. We pointed in the previous
issue of the PEO to major risks of overruns should economic growth fall
to 3%, not to say when it plunges to the lower end of the present government
range forecast of 1.7% to 3.7%. We recall that it was assumed in our simple
simulation that GDP and GDP deflator would grow 3% and 2.9% in 2009,
respectively. The same elasticities of tax revenue with respect to domestic
demand in the case of indirect taxes and the same elasticities with respect to
GDP in the case of income taxes as in the state budget draft were also
assumed. The result was that the tax revenue would fall by 5 billion zlotys
or 0.4% of 2009 GDP, projected at 1357 billion zlotys. Assuming that all other
revenue and expenditure would be in line with the state budget draft, the
cash deficit would stand at 23.2 billion zlotys or 1.7% of GDP. However, we
do not endorse such a benign growth scenario this year any longer (see
section on GDP growth). Assuming a hypothetical scenario of zero economic
growth as the worst case and the same tax elasticities, but lower GDP deflator
of 2% in 2009, we forecast that the tax revenue would be some 32 billion
zlotys (2.4% of GDP) short of 251.4 bn zlotys, projected in the state budget.
This would cause the cash budget deficit to reach about PLN 50 billion
or 3.8% of GDP, provided that all other revenue and expenditure remain
unchanged as in the state budget bill, i. e. ceteris paribus. The government
pledged to revise the state budget should things go wrong in the course of
the year. It has pledged to reduce expenditure of ministries by 10 billion
zlotys. Expenditure on roads, equal to additional 9.7 billion, has been moved
outside the central government budget as it will be financed by EIB loans and
bond issues. It will however raise the general government deficit. This debt
will be repaid after the investment projects are completed by means of the EU
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structural funds. When the total amount of 19 bn zlotys is excluded from the
state budget, our worst-case central government cash deficit would fall to 31
bn zlotys or 2.4% of GDP. This does not look excessive in times of economic
stagnation or creeping growth, at best. 
The general government deficit in ESA-95 terms will likely breach the 3%
threshold in 2009 as the automatic stabilizers such as income taxes and social
security premia will tend to raise the deficit of local governments and social
insurance funds. Local governments intend to speed up their infrastructure
outlays. Therefore we forecast that the general government deficit will
reach 3.2 – 3.5% of GDP in 2009, compared with the government target
of 2.5% of GDP. The breach of 3% could cloud the outlook for the ERM-2 entry.
So far, the deficit plans are consistent with the intent to adopt the euro
in 2012, but this date is becoming more and more uncertain because of the
soft zloty and its high volatility, likewise the lack of political consensus in this
country. The necessary amendments of the Constitution hinge on the yes by
the main opposition party. Even if the government were able to stick to its
deficit target, it would not be able to eliminate the political risk before
presidential and parliamentary elections due in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
This may lead to the excessive volatility of the zloty in the ERM-2 framework,
which could jeopardize the compliance with exchange rate criterion.
Labor Market
Employment
The symptoms of the world crisis have already become visible on the Polish
labor market. Although employment in the so-called enterprise sector (the
companies employing more than 9 workers) still increased by 3% yoy in
the 4Q2008, reaching 5,278,000, but the pace of growth was much slower
than 4.3% yoy in the 3Q2008, not to mention the 5.2% yoy in the 2Q2008. In
the 4Q2008 the number of employees fell by 0.3% on a quarterly basis and it
was the first q-o-q employment decrease since the 2Q2004. It all means
further deepening of the downward trend that started in the 2Q2008. 
Employment growth decelerated in all major industries, but the growth
figures dived most deeply in the manufacturing. The number of employees in
this industry virtually stopped growing, reaching exactly 0% yoy growth in
the 4Q2008. A quarter earlier it grew by as much as 2.0% yoy and by 3.6%
yoy in the 2Q2008. 
Employment growth also decreased in all other industries, except for
communal services and mining. In construction, it fell from 8.4% yoy in
the 3Q2008 to 7.4% yoy in the 4Q2008, in retail trade and consumer services
from 7.7% to 6.6% yoy, in business services from 8.5% to 5.7% yoy and in
transport and communications 3.8% to 3.3% yoy. 
Labor Force Survey (LFS) figures for the 4Q2008 were still positive, but the
first signs of deterioration were already visible. Although the total employment
in the economy increased by 3.0% yoy (0.1% qoq), it grew more slowly than
in previous quarters: 3.6% in the 3Q2008 and 3.5% in the 2Q2008.
The total number of working persons reached 16,005,000 in the 4Q2008.
The employment rate – the share of the total number of employed in the
working age population (15-64) – reached 60%, as compared to 58.1% a year
earlier. The level of economic activity of the population was still increasing in
the 4Q2008. The number of active population (those who are either employed
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or are looking for a job) increased by 1% yoy, and the economic activity rate
for working age population (15-64) reached 64.3% 
We expect that in the months to come the negative influence of the world's
turmoil on the Polish labor market will strengthen and hence we are less
optimistic than in the previous PEO issue. In the 1Q2009, the enterprise sector
employment growth should stop in y-o-y terms, and fall in q-o-q terms
by 0.4% We also expect that the LFS figures will start to deteriorate in 2009.
Employment growth in the 1Q2009 will fall to about 1.2% yoy, equivalent to
the q-o-q decrease of 2%. We expect that in 2009, on average, the
employment in enterprise sector will actually fall by 1.4% yoy and LFS
employment will fall by 0.5% – 1% yoy. 
Wages
Nominal wages are still increasing, but it seems that general deterioration
of the economic situation influenced also the wage setting process in
enterprises. In the 4Q2008, the average nominal wage in the enterprise sector
was by 8.2% higher than in the 4Q2007, while in the 3Q2008 the y-o-y
increase was 10.7% yoy. It was the second quarter in row of the falling y-o-y
wage dynamics, but this time, the reduction of the pace of the growth was
even stronger. Real wage dynamics in the 4Q2008 also decreased to the y-o-y
rate of 3.7% from 5.8% in the 3Q2008. 
The growth rate of nominal wages decreased in all industries. In
manufacturing, it decreased to 7.1% yoy from 10.1% in the 3Q2008. This
seems to be a significant drop, taking into account the historical stability of
wage dynamics in this industry, where the quarter to quarter volatility has not
even reached 2 percentage points for the last 5 years. It is a serious indication
of a trend reversal. The pace of growth also decreased rapidly in other sectors.
In construction, it fell to 8.9% yoy in the 4Q2008 from 12.8% in the 3Q2008;
in trade to 6.0% from 9.3% and in business services to 8.7% from 13.0%. 
We expect this downtrend to strengthen as the economic slowdown
continues. Average nominal wage growth in the 1Q2009 should fall to
around 5.5%-6% yoy. It will result in real wages growing at 3.5% yoy. On
average, nominal wages will grow in 2009 by 4%-5% and real wages by
about 3%. In 2010 the real wages can still grow on average by about 2% yoy. 
Unemployment
Following the other negative trends in the economy, unemployment has
definitely stopped to decrease. In the 4Q2008, number of registered
unemployed persons reached 1.47 million. This still meant a y-o-y reduction
of 15.6%, but it also meant the q-o-q increase of 7.1%. To compare, in the
same period of the last year the number of unemployed fell q-o-q by 7.8%. The
registered unemployment rate fell by 1.9 percentage points yoy to 9.5% in
the 4Q2008. It meant, however, the q-o-q increase by 0.6 percentage points. 
In order to have a more clear picture of the unemployment figures from the
final months of 2008 we have cleaned the numbers from a seasonal
component3. It appeared that in the 4Q2008, the seasonally adjusted number
of unemployed actually increased by 0.9% as compared to the 3Q2008. The
estimated seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in the end of the 4Q2008
was exactly the same as the registered one (9.5%), and it meant the seasonally
adjusted increase of 0.1 percentage points. This implies that the
3 De-seasoning performed using the DEMETRA 2.1 software and Tramo/Seats methodology.
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unemployment increase in the 4Q2008 was not only resulting from seasonal
factors, but reflected the real deterioration of the labor market. 
The other information coming for PES is also alarming. The number of
unemployed finding new jobs continued to fall, i. e. by 17.9% yoy in
the 4Q2008, and the number of those finding unsubsidized jobs dropped
even more quickly (by 20.6% yoy in the 4Q2008). On the other hand, one
records stronger increases of newly unemployed persons in registers. In
the 4Q2009 the number of the new unemployed increased by 7.1% yoy. 
The economic slowdown can already be noticed in LFS unemployment figures for
the 4Q2008 Although the number of unemployed fell by 20% yoy,
reaching 1,154,000, but it meant the q-o-q increase of 1.9%. It was the first q-o-q
increase recorded between the third and the fourth quarter of the year since 2001,
being one of the worst periods on the Polish labor market ever. The unemployment
rate still fell yoy by 1.8 percentage points reaching 6.6%, but it was higher by 0.1
percentage point than in the 3Q2009, also for the first time since 2001. 
The other data based on LFS can be found in EUROSTAT publishing monthly
so called harmonized unemployment rate for all EU members. According to this
(seasonally adjusted) data the unemployment rate in Poland in December 2008
was 6.5%, i.e. by 0.1 percentage point less than in September 2008. It means
that although the unemployment rate in Poland according to this measure still
kept falling, the pace of this reduction decelerated. 
We expect the registered unemployment rate to increase in the first quarter
of 2009 to 11.2%. The LFS unemployment should continue to increase in
the 1Q2009 and will reach 7.4%. Both, registered and LFS unemployment will
further grow in 2009. We expect the registered unemployment rate to
reach 12.2% at the end of 2009, while the LFS unemployment rate will
probably reach 8.5%-9%. Thus we have significantly corrected our last
forecasts upward. This correction results from our generally pessimistic
expectations concerning the economic growth in 2009. 
Figure 8. Employment and real wage dynamics in enterprise sector;
and registered unemployment dynamics in Poland 2003-2008
Source: Own calculations based on Statistical Bulletins of Polish CSO (GUS).
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External Trade and Balance of Payments
Foreign trade rose fast in terms of the euro in the first three quarters
of 2008. However the 4Q2008 brought about a break of these trends: exports
and imports of goods collapsed in the 4Q2008 (Figure 9). According to the
ever-revised NBP data, they fell by 8.6% yoy and 5.3% yoy, respectively,
compared with growth of 19.8% yoy and 21.4% for the first three quarters
of 2008. In the same period, the zloty exports and imports of goods decreased
by 6.3% yoy and 2.9% yoy, respectively while in the first three quarters
of 2008, they increased by 7.4% yoy and 8.8% yoy, respectively. Export and
import changes in the zloty are reported as well because they seem to be
better approximations of the changes in trade volumes due to wide
fluctuations in the exchange rates in 2008; volume data are not available from
the CSO as of writing. Exports and imports of services in euro terms did not
fare well, either. Exports fell by 4.9% yoy whereas imports grew by 1.7% yoy,
compared with 12.5% and 21.5% in the entire 2008, respectively. The collapse
of the upward trends clearly shows how the economic slump in the EU and
Eastern Europe adversely affected Polish foreign trade and by its channel
spread into the Polish economy. This was a strong demand shock that is likely
to persist for the several quarters and will likely strengthen in the 1Q2009.
Very bad figures on manufacturing sales in January strongly support this
statement. Distinctively higher economic growth in Poland than in the EU on
average has led to the differential rate of growth in exports and imports: This
has not changed in the 4Q2008, when the Eurozone recorded its worst
growth performance since its inception. 
Figure 9. Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, quarterly, EUR mn
When one looks at the geographical breakdown of CSO preliminary foreign
trade data, it is evident that they-o-y export rates of growth fell across the
board in the 4Q2008, be it developing countries, Eastern Europe or the euro
zone. The largest drop in exports was registered with Eastern Europe, which
includes Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. These countries experienced a deep
downturn: Ukraine and Belarus were granted IMF aid in order to avoid
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a macroeconomic destabilization while Russia had to grapple with the effects
of a dramatic fall in commodity prices. Russia and Ukraine were the fastest
growing markets for Polish exports during the first nine months of 2008, but
this occurred before these countries experienced the financial markets turmoil.
Russia kept its share in Polish exports at 5.3% in the 4Q2008, but Ukraine's
share fell to 3.8% in the entire 2008 from 4.0% in the first three quarters4. 
The CSO has already reported data on the merchandise trade for January
– November 2008 in fixed prices. According to them, volumes of exports and
imports were up 6.8% yoy and 7.9%, respectively, compared with 9.2% yoy
and 10.1% yoy in January- September 2008. The comparison of these data
suggests a strong decline in export volumes in the 4Q2008, another piece of
evidence that the severe recession in Western Europe has become a major
demand shock for the Polish economy. 
The rolling four-quarter current account deficit increased to 5.4% of GDP in
the 4Q2008 from 5.2% of GDP in the 3Q2008 and compared with 4.7% at
the 2007 yearend, according to the revised NBP data. Thus, a steep upward
trend in the deficit in 2007, which stood at 2.7% of GDP in 2006, flattened
in 2008. Despite a collapse in exports stronger than a decline in imports, the
fourth quarter did not bring a larger rise in the ratio than the previous
quarters of the year. The quarterly trade shortfall rose the least year on year
in the 4Q2008 while the negative balance on the income account decreased
considerably as profits of Polish companies dwindled.
Figure 10. Real Effective Exchange Rate of the Zloty, CPI deflated,
1999=100
Source: ECB appreciation (+).
The fourth quarter data and a further slump in the export orders bode bad
for exports in the near future. However, a further deterioration in the trade
deficit should stop at latest in the 2Q2009 because the rapid real depreciation
of zloty by over 20% on the back of the financial crisis has given Polish
companies a strong competitive edge (Figure 10). Actually, we forecast
a reversal of the trade deficit-widening trend. A continued positive growth
differential should be offset by two other factors. Imports of commodities have
4 Only cumulative data are published. The data on single quarters are unavailable.
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become much cheaper (natural gas prices have already peaked) and
investment imports should decline substantially as many private projects have
been be put off or scaled down until the recovery starts. The deficit on the
income account should be reduced as the corporate sector will post
significantly lower profits in 2009 than in 2008. The first signs were visible in
the 4Q2008 (see Figure 11). Further, Poland should use a much larger portion
of the EU funds than in 2008, which will also tend to improve the current
account deficit. We think that net transfers will slightly improve though private
remittances from abroad can decrease due to the rapidly increasing
unemployment in the EU countries that have become the main destinations of
Polish emigration such as Ireland, Spain and UK. Taking all the factors into
consideration, however, we do not see the reason for a revision of our previous
forecast of a weak downward trend in the current account deficit in 2009. 
Figure 11. Current Account Breakdown, % of GDP
A low liquidity of international financial markets prompts a question
whether the current account shortfall of 4% of GDP, i. e. our prediction, can
be financed without inducing a further bumpy depreciation of the currency.
EU funds that come through the capital account should finance the deficit of
the order of 1-1.5% of GDP so the actual needs for financing on the market
are lower than the total current account deficit. Net FDI inflows stood
at 2.3%% of GDP in 2008, down from 4.3% in 2007 so they funded less
than 50% of the 2008 deficit. Incoming FDI fell dramatically in the 4Q2008
because of an outflow in December. Prospects for FDI look bad under the
circumstances of the ever-worsening outlook for growth in the global
economy and worries of investors that the situation in East Europe has rapidly
deteriorated. It is unclear whether these investors will discern countries with
sound fundamentals. Since retained profits are a significant part of the net
FDI inflows in Poland and the profitability of companies has deteriorated, this
will adversely affect FDI figures in 2009. In our view, net FDI inflows will
decrease to 1.6% of GDP in 2009. This leaves a portion of the current account
deficit that should be financed by net portfolio and credit inflows of the
magnitude of 1-1.5% of GDP. This does not seem excessive should GDP
growth resume in the 2H2009.
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Is There a Room for Fiscal Stimulus?
A primer on fiscal policy
Discretionary fiscal policy is back in fashion after years of neglect during the
global crisis. There are two main reasons. Monetary policy is has proved little
efficient in times when banks have started rationing credit. Aggressive
reductions in interest rates by central banks have only fractionally been
passed to creditors as banks have tightened loan standards and started
discriminating borrowers. 
Another reason is the depth of the current global crisis that is unparallel to
any recession after the second world war. In the 1960s and 1970s, the abuses
of fiscal expansions led either to accelerating inflations or large public debts
or a combination thereof. Based on that experience, that also showed that
reality is far away from the „activist paradise”, i.e. a hypothetical world in
which especially fiscal policy, but monetary policy as well, achieves almost
a perfect control over aggregate demand, the economic literature is
suggesting now that during a typical recession fiscal policy should be
conducted by means of automatic stabilizers. These are institutional
arrangements that lead to the smoothing of a business cycle such as
(progressive) income taxes, unemployment benefits and social benefits. In
times of downturns (upturns), disposable incomes of people fall less than
GDP, therefore the aggregate demand declines (increases) less than GDP. The
stabilizers are automatic because once the intuitional arrangements are
made, the stabilizers work without any deliberate decision of the government.
However, this downturn is unprecedented, the worst in 60 years, so
discretionary government policy is justified because automatic stabilizers are
too weak, in particular in the USA, where taxes are less progressive and
unemployment and social benefits less generous than in Europe. 
There are a number of caveats of fiscal policy. One problem with
discretionary fiscal policy is that its effectiveness is impaired by a long
legislative lag. Decisions about additional spending or tax cuts in democracies
require a parliamentary debate, which can extend forever. Prolonged
discussions may imply that decisions by the legislature will be badly
synchronized with the business cycle, and the stimulus may raise the
aggregate demand by the time, when the economy has already started
recovering. An overheating will be a result of this. Further, these debates are
highly politicized as various factions try to pursue vested interests. They
attempt to add measures to the „stimulus package” that maximize votes, but
not necessarily the extra output per additional government spending or tax
(rate) cuts. Monetary policy does not suffer from such problems, and it is not
politicized when the central bank is independent.
Government spending crowds out private investment as fiscal expansion tends
to push interest rates up when it is financed by treasury bonds so marginal
investment projects may become unprofitable. Interest rates rise as higher income
due to higher government expenditure raises the demand for money while the
money supply remains constant. Then the money market is in disequilibrium. To
reduce the excess money demand, interest rates must rise, but this rise reduces
intended consumer expenditures for durables and investment. This basic result
obtained from the IS-LM model, the workhorse model of macroeconomics. There
would be no crowding out only if the interest responsiveness of planned spending
were zero (the IS curve is vertical) or when the interest responsiveness of the
money demand were infinite, i. e. the interest rate were fixed (the LM curve is
horizontal). In this case, there would be no upward pressure on interest rates
when the IS curve shifted rightward in the model. Other theoretical possibilities
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include accommodation of the excess demand for money by monetary expansion
or a situation when demand for money does not depend on GDP (income). 
Crowding out can be either partial or complete. There is complete crowding
out of a fiscal stimulus when the interest rate responsiveness of money
demand is zero, i. e. if the LM curve is vertical in the model. The private agents
hold on to their money balances, which are not reduced to the unchanged
level of money supply since we are assuming no shift in the monetary policy.
The only effect of a fiscal stimulus is to raise the interest rate in the economy.
It means that the increase in government spending is offset by a drop in
private spending by exactly the same amount. Otherwise, crowding out is
partial. Fiscal policy is potent when the demand for money is highly
interest-responsive. Empirical evidence supports the case for partial crowding
out so there is effects of fiscal expansion are real. 
It is a truism that discretionary fiscal stimuli should be timely, targeted and
temporary. The issue of timeliness has been discussed in the paragraph above.
The term „targeted” means that a stimulus should bring the most of an
additional zloty or euro of spending or tax reductions in terms of GDP. In this
respect, the estimates of multipliers of various kinds of spending are
important. Unfortunately, the so-called multiplier uncertainty is
overwhelming as we are, at best, likely to specify ranges within which the
values of different multipliers can lie (see table below). Nevertheless, the
theory tells us that government spending is more efficient than tax cuts or
transfers to the population provided this spending is designed in an efficient
way. The reason is that the government spending is a part of the aggregate
demand in the economy whereas tax (rate) declines or transfer increases
directly raise disposable income and only through it – aggregate demand so
a part of these cuts or transfers leaks as additional savings. With regard to
„targeted” stimuli, we know that different kinds of spending or tax cuts make
a difference. We are not in a model world from macroeconomic textbooks
where there is a single multiplier of autonomous demand or one marginal
propensity to consume. Public investment expenditure on road and railway
infrastructure, education and health care renewable energy sources can lift
the economy's growth potential over time while consumer expenditure will
have only short-lived effects. We know that households in lower-income
brackets have a higher propensity to consume than better-off households.
Therefore tax cuts should be geared to bringing additional disposable income
to low-income groups. Further, households under stress that asset prices have
dived and full of fear that they may lose job, may not spend the cuts in taxes.
Another advantage of a government spending over taxes, beside the fact
that it is an element of domestic demand whereas taxes are not, is that, relative
to tax changes, it should be easier stopped since investment projects should be
completed in a given time frame. Income tax cuts are hard to unwind after the
economy recovers because they rare politically unpopular while tax rises,
sometimes necessary to cool down the overheating economy, are hard to
institute for the same reason that they will anger the electorate. Therefore
government expenditure better fits the ideal of a temporary stimulus.
So far the discussion has been static, though the problem of a targeted
stimulus is also a dynamic nature. Tax cuts are deficient, relative to
government spending, because of a phenomenon called Barro-Ricardo (B-R)
equivalence. The B-R equivalence means that people treat as equivalent the
ways of financing government expenditure; they do not care, whether it is by
raised taxes or by contracting more public debt (bond issuance). When
government finances spending by issuing debt, people do not treat acquired
bonds as net wealth, but as a harbinger of future tax hikes in order to repay
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the debt. Therefore they do not raise their spending. If the government raises
taxes to finance its additional expenditure, people do not adjust their
consumption spending either because. The implications are devastating for
the effects of expansionary fiscal policy. Fortunately though, there are
theoretical arguments that qualify the conclusions the B-R equivalence.
Expansionary fiscal policy results in deficits. Cumulative government deficits
add up to the public debt. Governments have to observe the intertemporal
budget constraint that simply tells that debts have to be eventually repaid.
Simplifying models, the present discount value of a stream of tax receipts over
many years has to be equal to the present value of government spending over
the same period. Translated into a plain language, this means that debts cannot
grow without bound. At a certain period, government deficits have to be
replaced with surpluses. In practice, financial investors can fret when the
government debt-to-GDP ratio becomes too large as they have doubts whether
the government will honor its obligations and suspect that it may use the option
to default on the debt since it cannot or does not want to raise taxes to stop the
accumulation of debts. They see that the debt dynamics is explosive, the debt
continues increasing because the interest is so high that the government has to
draw more debt to repay it. Otherwise, it would have to reduce its budget deficit
sharply that would induce recession, a politically unpalatable option in many
cases. In countries, where central banks are not independent, there is also an exit
way in the form of a runaway inflation, which is ignited by a large increase in the
money supply that causes an erosion of the purchasing power of public debt
since it is stated in nominal terms. The central bank buys directly any amount of
government bonds in exchange for money that is used by the government to
redeem its obligations vis-a-vis private investors. 
Leaving aside the option of the debt monetization, the stabilization of public
debt levels either in absolute terms or as a given ratio to GDP becomes crucial.
The model analysis concludes that a primary budget surplus has to be equal to
the debt service, in order to stabilize the level of the public debt5. In order to
stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio, the government should run a primary surplus if
the average real interest rate on debt is higher than the rate of real GDP growth.
If this interest rate is lower than rate of real GDP growth, a country can run
primary budget deficits (in each case, the model gives a precise formula for the
size of a minimal surplus or a maximal deficit). In the latter case a balanced
primary budget is sufficient to induce a downward trend in the debt-to-GDP
ratio. Thus, rapidly growing economies can grow out of their public debts. 
The bottom line is that the deficit size matters. Countries with large public
debts and large deficits should barely use any fiscal stimulus because they risk
a fiscal destabilization. In the case of large public debts and small government
deficits or surpluses, the room for maneuver is rather small so these countries
have to be cautious. These countries should probably announce how they will
return on the path to fiscal prudence once recession is over. Countries with
small public debts can temporarily raise their deficit spending without risks. 
Case of Poland
Poland will be analyzed against this backdrop. The government of Poland
has rejected an idea of a discretionary fiscal stimulus and sticks to the plan of
a cash central government deficit of 18.2 bn zlotys despite the deteriorating
growth forecasts. 
The public sector deficit was about 2.8% of GDP in 2008, just a dash below the
Maastricht threshold. In the January update of Convergence Program, the
5 Primary budget surplus excludes the cost of debt service, i.e. interest rate payments.
24 POLISH ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 4/2008 (39)
SPECIAL TOPIC – IS THERE A ROOM FOR FISCAL STIMULUS?
government assumes that the structural deficit will be 2.6% of GDP in 2009 while
the actual deficit of the general government is projected at 2.5%. Since the
potential rate of growth is estimated at 4.8% of GDP, and the government has
projected a 3.7% GDP growth rate for 2009, these numbers would suggest that
the government intends to run a procyclical fiscal policy, i. e. to reduce aggregate
demand when the economy is considerably slowing. Despite all the uncertainty,
the 3.7% is definitely overly optimistic so were the government to stick to its
deficit target its policy would be even more procyclical. Actually, the lower
bracket for the government GDP growth projections is 1.7%, which due to the
ever-deteriorating outlook for the world economy, seems on the optimistic side
as well. If the government kept its target it would negatively influence the
aggregate demand even more. The government manifests its commitment to the
target by its emergency plan to reduce the central government expenditure by
some 10 bn zlotys (0.8 % of GDP) in 2009, should growth not meet its forecast.
This is done as it aims to enter the ERM-2 mechanism and wants to avoid the
uncertainty that the deficit criterion may not be met in time to get to the
Eurozone in 2012, which could trigger the currency speculation.
A citation from the Stability and Growth Pact (S&GP) would form an
additional frame. „Adherence to the objective of sound budgetary positions
close to balance or in surplus will allow all Member States to deal with normal
cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the
reference value of 3 % of GDP”, reads the resolution of European
Commission's on the S&GP from 1997. Poland missed the opportunity to
balance its public finances during a period of strong economic growth
in 2006-2007 so the room for maneuver is limited, as it should not breach
the 3% of GDP threshold unless it finds itself in a deep recession.
Definitely, should GDP growth slow hypothetically to 3.7% only, it could not be
treated as a recession at all, not to mention a deep recession that would justify
a breach of the 3%-of-GDP threshold, but 1.7% GDP growth or lower, down
from 4.8% in 2008 and over 6% in 2007, could possibly pass the test. This would
represent a decline in the GDP rate of growth by at least three to four percentage
points in one year. „A severe economic downturn” justifies a breach of the
Maastricht deficit criterion, according to the Stability and Growth Pact, which
defines it as „a negative annual GDP volume growth rate or an accumulated loss
of output during a protracted period of very low annual GDP volume growth
relative to its potential.” A drop in the growth rate to 1% in one year in Poland is
like a major recession. One could claim that it would be an equivalent of Eurozone
economies, shifting from a 2% growth to a 1-2% contraction. From this point of
view, a fiscal stimulus would unlikely provoke the criticism of the European
Commission and a reimposition of the Excessive Deficit Procedure on Poland that
was lifted in 2008, especially were this stimulus accompanied by a credible plan
how to reach a balance in the fiscal position once potential growth is restored.
The bottom line is that the actual level of a deficit allows for a modest stimulus.
Deficits accumulate in debts. The IMF study from 2003 suggested that „the
sustainable level of public debt varies between countries-depending on the
characteristics of each country-for the typical emerging market economy it is
often quite low. The analysis of overborrowing suggested that, based on past
fiscal performance, the sustainable public debt level for a typical emerging market
economy may only be about 25 percent of GDP, while the estimates of the fiscal
policy reaction functions indicated that emerging market economies as a group
have failed in the past to respond in a manner consistent with ensuring fiscal
sustainability once public debt exceeds 50 percent of GDP6. Thus the size of Polish
public debt at around 46% of GDP is not very low by emerging market standards,
but it is far below the Maastricht 60% of GDP threshold. Further, Poland is an
in-between case as its pier country group is concerned, and it has gained some
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credibility in keeping the public debt and deficits in check. The increase in the
deficit under the circumstances of a near-stagnation that we predict for 2009 in
this report will certainly raise this ratio by a few points. However, it is unlikely that
this ratio would approach 55% of GDP, the level that would trigger the
government corrective steps to keep the debt ratio from rising as specified by the
Polish law. These measures would require a very restrictive fiscal policy that would
induce recessionary tendencies. Had the government to resort to them, it could
lead to the periodical instability in financial markets like in 2003-2004, when risks
of such a breach were taken into account and its recessionary effects on the
economy that could undermine social cohesion. Likewise the deficit levels, the
debt ratio suggests that a modest discretionary stimulus, say 0.5% of GDP, would
be absorbed by financial markets without causing disruptions.
Fiscal deficits have to be financed and increased deficits are harder to get
funding. We claim that a moderate rise in the deficit would be justified from the
point of view of a downturn that Poland is experiencing at present. However,
Poland may have problems financing the deficit under the circumstances of the
global severe recession, as key economies such as the USA, UK and Germany are
going to launch large expansionary packages that will result in huge fiscal deficits.
Their issuance of government bonds is going to crowd out countries with lower
rating under the conditions of widespread risk-aversion. The USA is forecast to
borrow 1.75 bn dollars in the fiscal year 2009 while European large economies
may add 1 bn dollars to cover fiscal deficits and the cost of bank bail-outs. the
Poland that has quite large net borrowing requirements may find the debt service
costs inhibitive. This looks as the most serious argument that goes against the
discretionary fiscal stimulus right now. However, Greece whose sovereign credit
rating is similar to Poland's after a downgrade to A-/A2 with a stable outlook by
S&P has managed to successfully place a number of issues on the eurobond
market through a syndicate instead of auctions7. It tapped the market for almost
half of its borrowing needs this year. Perhaps, this is a recipe for Poland as well.
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